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THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE OF MUNICIPAL AMALGAMATION: ASKING THE 
CITIZENRY AND EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS  
 
ABSTRACT: Debate over municipal amalgamations in Australian continues to dominate local 
government reform agendas, with the putative need to achieve economies of scale and scope 
consistently set against anti-amalgamation arguments designed to preserve extant 
communities. Following from an examination of recent episodes of consolidation in 
Australia, this paper reports on citizens’ attitudes to amalgamation garnered from a national 
survey of 2,006 individuals. We found that generally, citizens are ambivalent toward 
amalgamation, although attitudes were influenced by particular demographic characteristics 
and attitudes to representation, belonging, service delivery requirements and the costs thereof. 
The results suggest that, away from the local government sector itself, structural reform may 
not be the vexatious issue it is often portrayed as. The implications of this are explored. 
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One of the intrinsic advantages of specialising in local government studies is that, 
commensurate with its multi-purpose nature and combined with its intrinsically 
intergovernmental character, the subject offers a rich palate from which to choose areas of 
research. For example, alongside inquiring into the normative defensibility of local 
government (Pratchett 2004) scholars can focus upon intergovernmental relations (Grant, 
Ryan and Kelly 2015b; Dollery, O’Keefe and Crase 2009) theories of management and 
leadership (Martin and Aulich 2012) community engagement (Head 2007) gender (Smith-
Ruig, Grant and Sheridan 2015) and elements of economics, finance and accounting systems 
as they pertaining to urban, regional or remote local government systems (Dollery, Kortt and 
Grant 2013). Further, these topics can be undertaken using a variety of comparative methods 
across state, national or indeed international jurisdictions, both contemporaneously and over 
time (Dollery and Grant 2013). 
However, just as it is possible to enjoy the cosmopolitan nature of local government 
studies, equally it is possible to hone in on one particular element of local government and 
examine this in great depth, over a long period of time and taking into consideration 
comparative experience from different political systems. Such is the case with structural 
reform of local government systems and (arguably) for some local government scholars. In 
the Australian context in particular, structural reform, defined as ‘changes to the boundaries 
and the number or types of municipal governments or municipal authorities’ (Dollery, Garcea 
and Le Sage. 2008: 7) is the public policy ‘gift that keeps on giving’, furnishing scholars and 
their commercial counterparts (to the extent that this delineation can be made precisely) with 
perennial, often hotly-contested reform processes that are veritable carnivals of conjecture 

































































and refutation, public policy formulation and money-making (see, for example, Robertson 
and McKenny 2015; Drew and Dollery 2015a)1. 
Further, commensurate with the episodic, yet seemingly random nature of 
amalgamation programs (Grant, Dollery and Crase 2009: 853-854) the level of consultation 
with the councils and communities that have been subject to structural reform programs has 
been highly variable and often  in many instances the source of long-standing acrimony,  and 
subsequent public policy back-tracking and political ramifications for state and territory 
governments (see, for example, Grant, Dollery and Kortt, 2015a; Legislative Council 2015; 
Dollery, Ho and Alin 2008). Arguably, these factorsis haves contributed to the shape of the 
public policy debate concerning municipal consolidation as being characterised by views 
driven by an economic requirement for efficiency on the one hand and the desire for local 
government to fulfil its role as the third tier in Australia’s democratic on the other hand (see, 
in particular Aulich 1999; 2005). 
Partially in an effort to inform this debate, in 2014-15 a major research project designed 
to solicit community attitudes to local government was undertaken (Ryan, Hastings, Woods, 
Lawrie and Grantxxxx 2015). The project sought to address a significant gap in local 
government research by examining how Australians value local government, aiming inter 
alia to investigate perceptions of the activities of local governments and its roles in society. 
The survey canvassed a range of topics, including levels of place-attachment, service delivery 
                                                
1 For instance, the Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) that was tasked with inquiring into 
reform options for NSW local government operated between March 2012 and October 2013. Alongside 
producing its own extensive literature, the Panel commissioned nine ‘Research Papers’ authored by an 
assortment of consulting firms (see ILGRP 2013). 
 
The question of the costs of with such heavy use of consultants did not go unnoticed by the (then) NSW Shadow 
Minister for Local Government, Sophie Cotsis. In a sitting of the Budget Estimates Committee 12 August 2013 
the Shadow Minister asked: ‘How much has been spent on the reviews and consultant reports since 2011?’ 
Minister Page stated: ‘My recollection … is that there is an amount of $1.8 million allocated for that particular 
review’. Further, ‘I think about $1.4 million or thereabouts has been spent to date’ (GPSC NO. 5 2013a, 7). In 
answer to the question of how much was spent on seven individual consultants’ reports by the DLG the Minister 
stated: ‘As all contracts were under $150 000, tenders were not required and therefore not called’ (GPSC No. 
2013b, 8). 

































































preferences and what roles citizens would like to see local government fulfill. Additionally, 
the survey (Ryan et al.xxxxx 2015) probed community attitudes toward amalgamation across 
a sample of 2,006 individuals. This paper reports on this aspect of this research and examines 
how it informs debate over consolidation in the Australian context. 
The paper is divided into four main parts. Section two undertakes a literature review of 
amalgamation in the Australian local government context. Section three briefly examines 
recent contributions to the scholarly literature on structural reform in the Australian context, 
documenting recent events in New South Wales (NSW), Western Australia, Tasmania, and 
Queensland and the Northern Territory, principally through the prism of the work of Joseph 
Drew and colleagues (Drew and Dollery 2015a; Drew and Dollery 2014a; 2014b; Drew, 
Kortt and Dollery 2015; 2013a; 2013b). Section four of the paper introduces the survey work, 
detailing the project as it pertained to local government amalgamation. Section four considers 
the implications of the survey results, and subsequent regression analysis, for local 
government reform in Australia and more generally. 
2. Literature examining structural reform in Australian local government 
Over the past two decades a corpus of work has developed devoted to considering structural 
reform, in particular amalgamations, as an enduring element of the Australian local 
government landscape. This literature can be divided into two main types. First, governments 
across Australia have produced a spate of reports examining the question of structural reform 
as an element of inquiring into the operational performance and financial sustainability of 
local government. TAt the federal level, the Australian Government has produced the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission’s Review of the Operation of Local Government 
(Financial Assistance) Act 1995 Report (CGC 2001) and the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration’s 
Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible Local Government (Hawker Report 2006). 

































































More recently, the Productivity Commission produced a major study Assessing Local 
Government Revenue-Raising Capacity (PC 2008). 
These reports , it is infrequently emphasised, exist alongside the annual Local 
Government National Reports investigation into the operation of the Financial Assistance Act 
1975 authored by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (DIRD 2015). 
While this publication is principally descriptive, the aforementioned reports emanating from 
the federal tier have been principally evaluative. In particular, they have found no consistent 
evidence to conclusively suggest that consolidated local governments are more economically 
efficient or financially sustainable (for a summary, see Dollery, Grant and Kortt 2013: 84-92; 
see also PWC 2006). This general conclusion was also echoed by a report into the nature of 
the infrastructure backlog commissioned by the Australian Local Government Association 
(ALGA) and conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC 2006). 
ASimilarly, at the state level a plethora of inquiries, typically commissioned by either 
state government or the respective local government associations, have examined structural 
reform as a mechanism to enhance both operational efficiency and financial sustainability. In 
the last decade alone these inquiries have included the South Australian Financial 
Sustainability Review Board (FSRB) Report (2005) Rising to the Challenge, the Independent 
Inquiry into the Financial Sustainability of NSW Local Government (‘Allan Report’) (2006) 
Are Councils Sustainable, the (then) Queensland Local Government Association’s (LGAQ) 
(2006; 2005) Size, Shape and Sustainability program, the Western Australian Local 
Government Association Report (2006) Systemic Sustainability Study: In Your Hands - 
Shaping the Future of Local Government in Western Australia and the Tasmanian Local 
Government Association Report ( LGAT 2007) A Review of the Financial Sustainability of 
Local Government in Tasmania dealt with the circumstances of local councils in their 
respective state jurisdictions.  

































































This not insignificant body of literature has recently been joined by the Queensland 
Treasury Corporation Report that inquired into the financial sustainability of select councils 
(QTC 2008),  and the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) ‘Review 
of the Revenue Framework for Local Government’ (IPART 2009) and IPART’s (2015) more 
recent ‘Final Report’ into options for reforming NSW local government.. As we shall see in 
the ensuing section of our discussion, this literature has been further augmented by a ‘next 
wave’ of governmental reports that have focused more precisely on the question of structural 
reform. The point in thise immediate context is to note the sheer quantity of government 
literature concerned directly with the question of the financial sustainability of Australian 
local government systems and as a consequence with structural reform as a mechanism by 
which to achieve enhanced financial sustainability.  
The second type of literature examining structural reform in the Australian local 
government context is that produced by the academy. Broadly speaking, there are three sub-
types within this category. First, the majority of academic writing concerning structural 
reform programs in the Australian context is concerned with examining and criticising the 
methodologies of the public literature utilising a variety of economic and econometric 
techniques. Rather than engaging in an archaeological exercise of past academic papers, we 
encounter several contemporary examples of this type in the next section of the paper. 
Nevertheless, a general observation can be made, namelyi.e.: that both historically and 
contemporaneously these papers take issue with proposals for amalgamation on political 
normative grounds, i.e.: that [i] amalgamation is bad because it dissolves political 
communities embodied in pre-existent councils without achieving projected efficiencies and 
[ii] the process of deciding upon amalgamation has not been consultative enough or has 
ridden roughshod over proper administrative procedure, real or imagined (on both the counts, 
see, for example, Dollery et al. 2008). 
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The second sub-type within theof academic literature concerned with structural reform 
is more constructive. In essence, it investigates and proposes solutions to the problems of 
operational efficiency and financial sustainability of local government other than 
amalgamation. FThus, for example, Byrnes et al. (2008) investigated the plausibility and 
mechanics of issuing bonds to supplement council income. Similarly, Dollery et al. (2013) 
explored the possibility of instituting a national bond bank modelled on similar institutions in 
New Zealand and British Colombia.  
The third sub-type within the academic literature is less concerned with evaluating 
specific programs of amalgamation and more interested inwith providing an account of 
structural reforms as an element of overall reforms to local government across Australian 
jurisdictions. For example, in his watershed account, Aulich (1999; 2005) distinguished 
between collaborative and technocratic state jurisdictions in the implementation of New 
Public Management (NPM) reforms, of which municipal consolidationamalgamation was a 
core element: 
 
The differences in emphases … has resulted in a divergence between local 
government systems, resulting in polarisation between New South Wales, 
Queensland and Western Australia, which continue to work collaboratively 
with local government and retain a high commitment to local democracy, and 
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, where economic efficiency has 
supplanted local democracy as a key value (Aulich 1999: 16-17). 
 
However, this conceptually neat distinction between ‘collaborative’ and ‘technocratic’ 
jurisdictions has subsequently been eroded as we briefly document in the next section. 

































































3. Recent episodes of structural reform in Australian local government 
Indeed, ALlocal government amalgamation has continued to capture the imaginations of 
policy-makers at the level of state and territory governments across the country as well as the 
lion’s share of public attention when it chooses to focus upon local government. For instance, 
at present in NSW the prospect of forced or coerced amalgamations across the state, in 
particular within the Sydney Metropolitan Region (SMR) have garnered the overwhelming 
weight of both scholarly work and media attention (see, for example, Abelson and Joyeux 
2015; Drew and Dollery 2015; Drew, Kortt and Dollery 2015a; Grant, Ryan and Lawrie 
2015b; Robertson and McKenny 2015; McKenny 2015; Robertson 2014). While at the time 
of writing the outcomes of this particular episode of consolidation are by no means clear, the 
NSW Government and its agencies, in particular the NSW Office of Local Government 
(OLG) and the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) have been severely 
criticised on the grounds of a lack of due process (Drew and Dollery 2015a) as well as on the 
basis of misleading claims as to the financial unsustainability of councils in that state (see, in 
particular, Ableson and Joyeux 2015). This has been the case to the extent that at the behest 
of several non-government parties in the NSW Parliament the Legislative Council is at 
present conducting an public inquiry into the process writ large (Legislative Council 2015). 
Further, Western Australia has historically been all but immune from voluntary, 
coerced of forced amalgamation programs (see, for example Grant, Dollery and Westhuizen 
2012) despite extended processes of inquiry and reform (see, for example, Dollery and Grant 
2009). Thus, the ‘Final Report’ of the ‘Metropolitan Local Government Review’ (MLGRP 
2012) recommended that the number of councils in that city be reduced from 30 to 16. 
However, fFollowing concerted community pressure and academic criticismque of the 
mooted reforms based upon the application of several econometric models to the financial 
data of the affected councils (Drew and Dollery 2014a) the program of consolidation was ‘put 

































































on hold’ by the government pending approval from individual councils on a case-by-case 
basis, (although (again) at the time of writing the Barnett Government still planned to 
introduce a ‘City of Perth Act’ (Barnett and Simpson, 2015)). Yet despite the eventual non-
execution of a program of amalgamation, its shadow has nevertheless has fallen long over 
both local governments and state governments in that jurisdiction. 
Similarly, the prospect of council amalgamation in Tasmania since the last round of 
consolidation in 1993 has rested outside the public policy agenda of successive state 
governments. However, the idea of amalgamating councils in the Southeast (including those 
LGAs comprisingin the Greater Hobart Region) and around the Northeast City of Launceston 
have both been investigated by a range of interest groups since that time, including the 
Southern Tasmania Council Authority (see, for example, STCA ‘Munroe Report’, 2011) and 
the Northern Tasmania Regional Development Board (Dollery 2012). In step with these 
investigations, in 2011 the Property Council of Australia engaged Deloitte Access Economics 
(DAE) to examine the possible benefits of a program of council amalgamation across the 
state. The DAE report, ‘Local government structural reform in Tasmania’ (DAE 2011: i) 
claimed that ‘[s]tructural reform of councils in Tasmania could allow for efficiency gains of 
up to 35%’. The analysis was criticised by Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2013b) who inter alia 
claimed that the underlying assumption of the DAE analysis was untenable.  
Additionally, the consequences of the acrimonious 2007 forced amalgamation program 
in Queensland, which saw 157 councils agglomerated into just 73, continue to resonate in that 
jurisdiction. Of most salience in this regard have been the episodes of de-amalgamations 
embarked upon by Douglas Shire, Livingstone Shire, Mareeba Shire and Noosa Shire 
(Queensland Government 2013). The option for de-amalgamation formed a salient 
component of the (then) Queensland Liberal-National Opposition’s policy platform prior to 
the 2012 state government election in response to the (then) Labor Government’s forced 

































































amalgamation program and is one of several reasons given for the dramatic 2012 state 
election result, which saw the Bligh Labor Government reduced from a majority in the 89 
seat parliament to just 7 seats (Grant et al. 2015a: 6). Equally, dissatisfaction with the 
program of de-amalgamation following the election of the Liberal-National Party (LNP) 
Government led by Campbell Newman, which saw 12 councils apply for the process to be 
initiated to the Queensland Boundaries Commission but only four succeed in pursuing such a 
program, is cited as a contributing factor for that Government’s routing in the 2015 state 
election, that saw the LNP retain only 42 seats with the Labor Party re-gaining office as a 
minority government with 44 seats (Green 2015). 
The political ramifications of recent episodes of programs of forced amalgamation 
extend to the Northern Territory. Amalgamations had been mooted in the Territory since 
1999 (Tiley and Dollery 2010: 16). In October 2006 the (then) minister announced a program 
of amalgamation that eventually commenced in July 2008 (Michel, 2015: 103). What Michel 
(2015: 102) labelled as a process of ‘sweeping regionalisation’, entailing the forced 
amalgamation of 53 community councils into eight regional shires, is offered as a primary 
reason for the defeat of the then long-standing Labor Government in the ensuing Northern 
Territory election held in August 2012. This linking of the amalgamation program to the 
change of government is notwithstanding the more nuanced reasons offered for the electoral 
result, inclusive of the Labor Government’s complacency with respect to the Aboriginal vote 
(Gerritsen 2012) and the place of Indigenous community interests in the 2008 amalgamations 
(Michel 2015: 107-108). 
 
Three general points can be distilled from the above discussion in sections 2 and 3 of 
the paper. First, the evidence regarding structural reform as a means to achieve both 
operational efficiencies and financial sustainability is at best mixed. Second, as a topic for 
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both scholarly inquiry and popular public policy debate the issue of local government 
amalgamations looms large in Australia’s municipal landscapes. Third, as a political issue 
municipal amalgamation spills over to affect the governments of the sovereign states and the 
Northern Territory.. Otherwise stated, the issue of amalgamation is clearly ‘bigger’ than local 
government itself.  
However, it is also possible that as an issue municipal amalgamation ‘fuels its own 
fire’: That the importance it assumes in the scholarly literature and as a political issue is 
greater than is warranted. The question of whether amalgamation is as hotly a contested or 
heart-felt issue in the broader community as an element of local government generally has not 
been thoroughly investigated to any extent. WIt is with this in mind that we now turn to the 
survey. 
4 Surveying community attitudes to Australian local government 
In 2013 the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government (ACELG)XXXX 
commenced a research project designed to understand community attitudes to local 
government (Ryan et al.xxxx 2015). The focus of this on-going research is to investigate the 
context for interactions between Australian communities and their local governments through 
questions focused on community awareness, attitudes and participation in their local area and 
with local government. This contrasts to previous local government research aimed at 
soliciting community views that  has been preoccupied with the roles and responsibilities of 
local government orprincipally deployed citizen satisfaction surveys (for an critical overview 
of the use of citizen satisfaction surveys, see Ryan et al.xxxx 2015). In 2014 ACELG 
implemented aA national survey was implemented in late-2014 as ‘Sstage Oone’ of a larger 
stage mixed methods research project2. 
                                                
2 The ACELG’s ‘Why Local Government Matters’XXXX social research project’s qualitative phase, involving 
focus groups held nationally across a range of local government area types, is being undertaken at time of 


































































The development and refinement of thea conceptual framework for the research project 
involved an extensive literature review, consultation with the local government sector and a 
steering group of research staff and associates (Ryan et al.xxxx 2015). Based on this work, 
four key areas of enquiry emerged: 
1. Local government’s role as a ‘place shaper’ and its importance in meeting the needs 
of citizens that drive attachment and satisfaction with the area in which they live; 
2. The preferences of communities for how their services are delivered at the local level 
and the ability of local governments to offer flexible and community specific service 
delivery; 
3. Theories of governance, particularly community beliefs concerning large versus small 
government and its role in the market; the appropriate role for the private sector in 
local service provision, the preferred extent of public participation in government 
decision-making, and preferences for the realisation of public value, and 
4. Community knowledge of local government, the ranked importance of services that 
can be delivered by local government in different jurisdictions, and attitudes about 
amalgamation. 
Further, the attributes of individuals that were theorised to influence their attitudes and beliefs 
about each of the areas above, inclusive of demographic factors, levels of community 
participation, and personal values and political leanings were incorporated into the empirical 
strategy (Ryan et al.xxxx 2015). 
METHODOLOGY 
A telephone survey company was commissioned from October-November 2014. The survey 
used a sample frame of randomly selected landline telephone numbers from all states and 
                                                                                                                                                  
writing. In 2016, a revised version of the cross-sectional survey will be repeated to serve as national base-line 
data for future waves and data collected by researchers in state or local government area jurisdictions.  

































































territories of Australia (with the exception ofexcluding the Australian Capital Territory which 
does not have a local government structure). Responses to the survey were collected from 
2,006 people aged 18 years and over using a computer-aided telephone interview mode. A 
quota for type of local government area in which each respondent resided was set to allow 
meaningful comparisons to be made between those living in rural and remote areas, regional 
urban areas, and city councils of four types using the Australia classification of local 
governments (see DIRD 2015).  
Within a longer survey designed to solicit attitudes concerning place attachment, 
service delivery and governance, respondents were asked a question about a hypothetical 
amalgamation of local governments:  
 
‘Imagine that your local government is to be merged or amalgamated with 
another to form a new local government area. For each of the following, tell 
me if the amalgamation would make things much better, better, no different, 
worse or much worse?’.  
 
Each of the four sub-questions focused on different dimensions of the possible impacts of 
amalgamation on the respondent, namely: [i] political representation, [ii] the cost of rates; 
[iii] the way services are delivered, and [iv] the impact on a sense of local community. 
Additional demographic, values, community participation and local government knowledge 
variables from the survey were selected for investigation on the basis of a hypothesised role 
in influencing the responses to questions concerning amalgamation.  
Following thean constructioninspection of a correlation matrix of these variables and an 
inspection of the results of Chi-square tests for association with each of the amalgamation 
questions, a short list of variables was determined for inclusion in multinomial logistic 
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regression analysis of the amalgamation questions. These variables are summarised in Table 
A1 (see Appendix). 
FINDINGS 
The research findings are presented here in two tranches. First, we examine the reported 
impact of amalgamation across the four areas of importance specified by the methodology 
([i] political representation; [ii] rates; [iii] impact on sense of community and [iv] the way 
services are delivered). Second, we analyse the variations in response according to the 
characteristics of each respondent using regression. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
responses to each of the four statements under analysis (excluding ‘don’t know’ answers).  
 
<< Please draw in Figure 1 about here >> 
 
Examining Figure 1, generally respondents reported being most concerned about the impact 
of amalgamation upon how their interests are represented by councillors, with 52.2% 
reporting that representation by councillors will get ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ following 
amalgamation. Respondents were more ambivalent about the impact of amalgamation on 
their sense of local community, with 57.0% reporting that it will make no difference. Only 
35.7% reported that amalgamation would make their sense of community ‘worse’ or ‘much 
worse’.  
The perceived impact ofWhether amalgamation would impact upon both the cost of 
council rates and the way services are delivered solicited a more divided general responses. 
Examining Figure 1, cCompared to other questions, a larger proportion of respondents 
reported being optimistic about the impact of amalgamation, both on the cost of council rates 
( with 20.6% responding that the cost of council rates would be ‘better’ or ‘much better’) and  
the way that services would be delivered (how services are delivered, with just over 20% 
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believing that both will become 21.5% reporting that service delivery would be ‘better’ or 
‘much better’). Yet. However, approximately 540.3% reporteded that the cost of council rates 
would be ‘worse’ or much ‘worse’, while 39.6% reported that they believed service delivery 
would be rendered ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’. In particular, there was a marked diminution in 
the ambivalence toward the perceived impact that amalgamation would have on the cost of 
council rates with only 29.1% selecting the ‘no different’ response. for the same question. 
Tables 1a and 1b present the output table for our multinomial regression models across 
two parts. Table 1a contains the odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals associated with 
‘much better/better’ responses; Table 1b contains those associated with ‘no difference’ 
responses. The reference category in both cases is ‘much worse/worse’. In order to allow 
comparison across the four dimensions of amalgamation affects, each of the questions has 
been modelled using the same variables3.  
 
<< Please draw in Tables 1a and 1b here >> 
 
Perceived changes to representation by councillors 
Examining Tables 1a and 1b, reported political affiliations were associated with differences 
on the question of amalgamation. Thus, compared to Liberal/National coalition voters, 
respondents who reported as typically voting for the Greens (OR=0.44, 95% CI 0.20 to 0.96) 
                                                
3 Odds Ratios are a measure of explanatory variable effect size where the response variable is categorical. In this 
analysis, the output of Table 1a contains the odds ratios, or effect size, of a number of explanatory variables on 
the likelihood of respondents answering ‘better/much better’ rather than ‘worse/much worse’ for each question. 
In the simplest case, taking (for example) the variable for sex (male or female), the odds ratio describes the odds 
of men responding ‘better/much better’ compared to the odds of women (the reference category) responding 
‘better/much better’ to the same question. In basic terms, the odds ratio is the ratio of the number of men who 
responded ‘better/much better’ to the number of men who responded ‘worse/much worse’, divided by the ratio 
of the number of women who responded ‘better/much better’ to the number of women who responded 
‘worse/much worse’. An odds ratio of less than one indicates that men are relatively less likely than women to 
respond ‘better/much better’. An odds ratio of more than one indicates that men are relatively more likely than 
women to respond ‘better/much better’. An odds ratio of one signifies that there is no difference between the 
response patterns of women and men (see Menard 2002: 42-68).  
 

































































or who reported changing their vote from election to election (OR=0.58, 95% 0.34 to 0.99) 
were less likely to think amalgamation would make representation by councillors better. 
Those who reported a tendency to vote for independents and minor parties (OR=0.19, 95% CI 
0.04 to 0.82) were even less likely, whilst Labor (OR=1.03, 95% CI 0.69 to 1.55) and 
Liberal/National voters showed no real difference of opinion. Otherwise stated, people who 
reported voting Green, independent or for minor parties as well as those that who reported as 
swinging voters thought they have more to lose through amalgamation, in terms of their level 
of representation, compared to those who reported as voting for the major parties. 
Second, respondents who could accurately give the name of their local mayor 
(OR=0.70, 95% CI 0.48 to 1.01) were also less likely to think that amalgamation would 
improve representation; as were people who had lived in the area longer (e.g.: 5 to 10 years 
OR=0.36, 95% CI 0.14 to 0.91 compared with those less than 2 years). This suggests that 
residents who are more invested in their local area are most concerned about the impacts of 
amalgamation on their representation by councillors. Third, certificate or diploma level (i.e.: 
vocational) qualifications (OR=0.60, 95% CI 0.38 to 0.94) were also associated with higher 
levels of pessimism about the effect of consolidation, compared with those who reported as 
having only school-only level qualifications. 
Fourth, people who reported as speaking a language other than English at home 
(OR=2.22, 95% CI 1.23 to 4.00), or who reported as unemployed (OR=1.85, 95% CI 0.93 to 
3.65) rather than employed for wages were more likely to be optimistic about the effects of 
amalgamation on representation by councillors. Fifth (and perhaps surprisingly), compared to 
those living in large metropolitan and capital city councils, people in rural and remote areas 
(OR=1.81, 95% CI 1.02 to 3.20) were somewhat more likely to think representation would 
improve after amalgamation. 

































































Perceived changes to the cost of council rates 
Party-political considerationss played less of a role in determining people’s views about 
council rates compared to the question on representation by councillors. As illustrated in 
Table 1b, people who reported as voting for minor parties and independents (OR=0.54, 95% 
CI 0.32 to 0.91), or who reported as changing their vote from election to election (OR=0.70, 
95% CI 0.52 to 0.94), were less likely to answer ‘no difference’ (rather than ‘worse/much 
worse’) compared to Liberal/National voters. However, as seen in Table 1a, political 
affiliation did not have a significant effect in moving people from a ‘worse/much worse’ to a 
‘better/much better’ response. Second, again people who had resided locally longer (e.g.: 
more than 10 years OR=.25, 95% CI 0.09 to 0.70 compared with those less than 2 years), or 
who reported as having postgraduate (OR=3.10, 95% CI 1.65 to 5.83) or certificate/diploma 
(OR=0.56, 95% 0.33 to 0.96) rather than school level qualifications, were less likely to think 
amalgamation would make the cost of council rates better.  
Third, compared to employed people, those reporting as unemployed (OR=3.14, 95% 
CI 1.44 to 6.86) and students (OR=2.72, 95% CI 0.87 to 8.57) were much more likely to 
believe that the cost of council rates would improve; as were people who reported speaking a 
language other than English at home (OR=3.10, 95% CI 1.65 to 5.83). Fourth, residents of 
both rural/remote (OR=1.94, 95% CI 0.97 to 3.89) and urban regional councils (OR=1.84, 
95% CI 0.90 to 3.75) were more likely than those in large metropolitan and capital cit  
councils to think council rates would improve. 
Perceived changes to service delivery 
Examining Table 2a and 2b for perceptions in changes to service delivery, demographics 
yielded interesting variations. Men (OR=1.82, 95% 1.37 to 2.43) reported as more likely than 
women to expect benefits from amalgamation, as were younger people, with 19-29 year olds 
(OR=4.94, 95% CI 2.22 to 10.99) much more likely than those over 70 years to think 

































































amalgamation would make service delivery better. Second, those who reported as voting 
Labor (OR=0.65, 95% CI 0.46 to 0.90), Greens (OR=0.55, 95% CI 0.32 to 0.95) or as 
‘swinging’ voters (OR=0.49, 95% CI 0.32 to 0.75) were less likely than those who reported 
as voting Liberal/National to think service delivery would improve. Third, respondents who 
could name their mayor (OR=0.72, 95% 0.54 to 0.96) were a little less likely to think service 
delivery would improve. 
Perceived changes to sense of local community 
Men (OR=2.08, 95% CI 1.55 to 2.77) were more likely than women, and 18-29 year olds 
(OR=2.93, 95% CI 1.35 to 6.33) were more likely than those aged 70 years or more to think 
their sense of local community would improve with amalgamation. Second, there was also 
here a strong correlation with political affiliation, with respondents who reported as voting 
for Labor (OR=0.59, 95% CI 0.42 to 0.83), minor parties/independents (OR=0.43, 95% CI 
0.19 to 0.93), and those reporting as swing voters (OR=0.64, 95% CI 0.42 to 0.95) being less 
likely to think that their sense of local community would improve compared to 
Liberal/National voters. Third, being a local resident for more than 10 years (OR=0.49, 95% 
CI 0.22 to 1.08), compared to under 2 years was associated with being less likely to think a 
sense of local community would improve. 
5. Recapitulation and implications 
This paper commenced by observing the salience of the issue of amalgamation in the 
Australian local government context, arguing that the issue has been a central feature of both 
governmental inquiries examining options for local government reform as well as the issue 
dominating the academic literature in that regard. We also argued that the conjecture and 
refutation surrounding amalgamation centred on arguments that amalgamation can achieve 
both scale and scope economies, and more recently ‘strategic capacity’ (ILGRP 2013: 15), set 
against arguments that it cannot achieve these public policy goals. We noted as well that two 

































































political arguments accompanied the anti-amalgamation empirical claims, albeit often in a 
latent way: First, that amalgamation erodes or destroys extant communities; second that 
processes of amalgamation are undertaken with insufficient consultation. 
The details of the empirical research – designed to understand community attitudes to 
local government broadly – were then briefly specified. This included the theorising behind 
the project that identified (1) place attachment; (2) preferences for service delivery; (3) the 
role of the public and private sectors in service delivery and (4) community knowledge and 
expectations of local government as broad concerns that framed questions for the survey 
instrument. The methodology for the interviews of 2, 006 individuals by (landline) telephone 
was described and the question regarding amalgamation was specified, as were the variables 
included in the regression (see Table A1).  
The general results reported in the first tranche in relation to Figure 1 stand in contrast 
to the salience of the issue of amalgamation in both the public and academic literature, 
particularly with respect to the first political claim of anti-amalgamation advocates, namely 
the importance of a sense of community. On the contrary: 57.0% of respondents reported that 
it would make ‘no difference’ to their sense of community. However, amalgamation proved a 
divisive issue, with 35.7% reporting that amalgamation would make their sense of 
community it ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’. Taken as a whole, these responses raise the 
possibility that for many individuals their sense of community might be distinct from local 
government. 
Similarly, over 20% believed that the cost of rates would improve and service delivery 
would improve; yet approximately 40% reported ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ for the same 
question. Again, amalgamation was divisive rather than definitive. Further, the 52.2% 
reporting that representation by councillors would be worse, while also indicative of this 

































































division, might indicate that a majority of people have a service-delivery orientation to local 
government rather than a ‘political’ view. 
For the second tranche of results incorporating the regressed variables for individual 
respondents, we found that the views of respondents concerning the possible effects of 
amalgamation were dependent on both their reported personal attributes and the perceived 
impact of amalgamation that was being tested in each question. However, stepping back from 
the detail provided in the discussion above, some general patterns are discernible. First, what 
might be called ‘localism’ across the sample, broadly defined as an attachment to the local 
area (marked by length of residency and the correct identification of mayors) and a general 
disapproval of council amalgamation across the four questions, was notably affected by 
party-political preference: Voters unaligned to the major parties (Liberal, National and Labor) 
were more likely to be pessimistic about the impacts of amalgamation, particularly with 
respect to the representation of their interests by councillors. 
Second, measures of socio-economic disadvantage, including reported levels of 
education, employment status and whether a language other than English was spoken at home 
all correlated less with a dislike of amalgamation. Further, the age profile of respondents was 
important, with younger people being less averse to amalgamation compared to older people 
(70 +) being more averse to amalgamation. Third, there was no evidence of a marked 
increase in dislike of amalgamation in rural and remote areas; on the contrary: With respect 
to the questions of perceived changes to their representation and the perceived effect on rates, 
rural and remote individuals were less averse to amalgamation than their counterparts in 
larger metropolitan local government areas.  
In general however, what is most revealing about the results is the relatively high 
proportion of respondents across all sub-questions who believed that amalgamation would 
make minimal difference to council costs, service delivery, the representation of their 

































































interests by councillors or their sense of local community. This suggests that debates 
concerning amalgamation do indeed ‘fuel their own fire’: Those closest to the heat of change 
– elected representatives and the staff who stand to lose their positions, for example – may be 
virulently anti-amalgamation and attract subsequent media attention, yet this sentiment is not 
echoed in the broader community. This conclusion can be set against evidence presented in 
section 3 of our discussion, that suggested that the political consequences of amalgamation 
reforms – both executed (Queensland, for example) and threatened (Perth) – resonate 
politically at the state and territory level. However, this apparent tension may be at least 
partially explained by the suggestion that amalgamation (and local government reform 
generally) might only draw the attention of voters when it happens to them. Otherwise stated, 
a nationally representative sample such as the one sourced for this survey might not capture 
the locally based vexation about the issue. 
Notwithstanding this speculation, the data and analysis presented here suggests that the 
issue of amalgamation is overdone in the government and academic literature compared to 
perceptions of the issue more broadly. Moreover, the study suggests what is valuable for 
individuals about local government, namely the services and amenities they provide, over and 
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Table 1a: Multinomial regressions associated with ‘much better/better’ responses 
 Representation Council Rates Way services delivered Sense of local community 
Better/Much Better Exp (B) 95% C.I.  
Exp (B) 
Exp (B) 95% C.I.  
Exp (B) 
Exp (B) 95% C.I.  
Exp (B) 
Exp (B) 95% C.I.  
Exp (B) 
Male 1.24 [.86, 1.79] 1.29 [.83, 2.00] 1.82*** [1.37, 2.43] 2.08*** [1.55, 2.77] 
Age 18-29 1.82 [.71, 4.71] 1.19 [.37, 3.77] 4.94*** [2.22, 10.99] 2.93*** [1.35, 6.33] 
  30-39 1.02 [.42, 2.46] .68 [.23, 2.07] 2.09** [1.02, 4.28] 1.24 [.61, 2.54] 
  40-49 .92 [.40, 2.12] .89 [.33 ,2.41] 1.65 [.83, 3.27] 1.51 [.77, 2.97] 
  50-59 .87 [.41, 1.86] .77 [.31, 1.91] 1.79* [.96, 3.34] 1.59 [.86, 2.93] 
  60-69 1.05 [.58, 1.93] .62 [.30, 1.31] 1.84** [1.08, 3.13] 1.62* [.96, 2.73] 
  70 plus         
Politics Change between elections .58** [.34, .99] .75 [.40, 1.40] .49*** [.32, .75] .64** [.42, .95] 
  Labor 1.03* [.69, 1.55] .94 [.57, 1.56] .65*** [.46, .90] .59*** [.42, .83] 
  Greens .44** [.20, .96] .79 [.34, 1.82] .55** [.32, .95] .80 [.47, 1.36] 
  Other  .19** [.04, .82] .38 [.11, 1.37] .64 [.32, 1.28] .43** [.19, .93] 
  Liberal/National          
Knowledge of the name of Mayor .70** [.48, 1.01] .84 [.54, 1.30] .72** [.54, .96] .92 [.69, 1.22] 
NESB 2.22*** [1.23, 4.00] 3.10*** [1.65, 5.83] .86 [.52, 1.43] .90 [.54, 1.50] 
Education Postgraduate .59* [.31, 1.11] .32*** [.14, .75] 1.51* [.94, 2.42] 1.76** [1.10, 2.82 
 Bachelors/ .78 [.48, 1.26] .71 [.40, 1.27] 1.71*** [1.14, 2.55] 1.31 [.87, 1.96] 
 Certificate/diploma .60** [.38, .94] .56** [.33, .96] .91 [.62, 1.34] .92 [.62, 1.35] 
 School level         
Employment Unemployed 1.85* [.93, 3.65] 3.14*** [1.44, 6.86] .83 [.45, 1.53] .89 [.48, 1.64] 
 Retired 1.09 [.56, 2.11] 1.18 [.51, 2.72] .73 [.44, 1.22] .77 [.46, 1.29] 
 Student 1.59 [.58, 4.39] 2.72 [.87, 8.57] 1.05 [.46, 2.38] 1.49 [.61, 3.60] 
 Homemaker 1.50 [.65, 3.50] 1.68 [.63, 4.52] .78 [.38, 1.61] .64 [.29, 1.45] 
 Self-employed .95 [.51, 1.79] .97 [.43, 2.18] .61** [.37, 1.01] .75 [.47, 1.21] 
 Employed for wages         
Resident > 10 years .45* [.19, 1.03] .25*** [.09, .70] .62 [.28, 1.36] .49* [.22, 1.08] 
 5 to < 10 years .36** [.14, .91] .36* [.12, 1.12] .78 [.34, 1.79] .56 [.24, 1.30] 
 2 to < 10 years .42* [.16, 1.12] .38 [.12, 1.26] .65 [.27, 1.57] .54 [.23, 1.30] 
 < 2 years         
ACLG Rural and remote  1.81** [1.02, 3.20] 1.94* [.97, 3.89] 1.06 [.67, 1.67] .83 [.52, 1.31] 
 Urban regional  1.25 [.68, 2.31] 1.84* [.90, 3.75] .86 [.54, 1.37] .67* [.42, 1.07] 
 Urban fringe  1.56 [.88, 2.79] 1.18 [.57, 2.44] 1.49* [.95, 2.32] 1.21 [.79, 1.88] 
 Urban dev. small 1.12 [.61, 2.07] 1.10 [.53, 2.30] 1.37 [.89, 2.13] 1.20 [.78, 1.85] 
 Urban dev. large & capitals          
Reference Category is: Worse/Much Worse; *p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01  































































Table 2: Multinomial regressions associated with ‘no difference’ responses 
 Representation Council Rates Way services delivered Sense of local community 
No Different Exp (B) 95% C.I. Exp 
(B) 
Exp (B) 95% C.I. Exp 
(B) 
Exp (B) 95% C.I. Exp 
(B) 
Exp (B) 95% C.I. Exp 
(B) 
Male 1.16 [.94, 1.44] 1.19 [.96, 1.47] 1.13 [.90, 1.42] 1.58*** [1.25, 2.01] 
Age 18-29 1.19 [.65, 2.16] 1.21 [.66, 2.22] 1.67 [.86, 3.25] .84 [.42, 1.68] 
  30-39 .95 [.58, 1.58] 1.15 [.70, 1.91] 1.34 [.78, 2.31] .98 [.57, 1.71] 
  40-49 .93 [.57, 1.50] .88 [.54 ,1.42] .89 [.53, 1.50] .76 [.44, 1.29] 
  50-59 .95 [.61, 1.47] 1.07 [.69, 1.64] .81 [.51, 1.29] .83 [.51, 1.33] 
  60-69 1.13 [.79, 1.62] 1.05 [.74, 1.49] .98 [.67, 1.43] 1.02 [.70, 1.51] 
  70 plus         
Politics Change between elections .80 [.59, 1.08] .70** [.52, .94] .83 [.59, 1.15] 1.00 [.72, .1.40] 
  Labor 1.14 [.89, 1.47] .82 [.64, 1.05] .95 [.73, 1.24] .96 [.73, 1.27] 
  Greens .65** [.43, .97] .73 [.50, 1.08] .94 [.61, 1.44] 1.27 [.81, 1.99] 
  Other  .66 [.38, 1.13] .54** [.32, .91] .72 [.40, 1.29] .47** [.24, .93] 
  Liberal/National          
Knowledge of the name of Mayor .74* [.60, .91] .82* [.66, 1.01] .81* [.64, 1.02] 1.00 [.78, 1.26] 
NESB 1.19 [.78, 1.81] .69* [.45, 1.06] .57** [.36, .92] .60** [.37, .99] 
Education Postgraduate .81 [.57, 1.15] .69** [.49, .97] .96 [.66, 1.41] 1.48** [1.00, 2.19 
 Bachelors/ .81 [.60, 1.09] .79 [.59, 1.06] 1.08 [.78, 1.49] 1.28 [.92, 1.79] 
 Certificate/diploma .86 [.66, 1.13] .74** [.56, .98] .72** [.54, .97] .82 [.60, 1.12] 
 School level         
Employment Unemployed 1.04 [.65, 1.65] 1.38 [.85, 2.25] 1.03 [.62, 1.69] .95 [.57, 1.61] 
 Retired .96 [.66, 1.41] .79 [.54, 1.15] .91 [.60, 1.37] .92 [.61, 1.40] 
 Student 1.06 [.52, 2.17] 1.53 [.73, 3.21] .92 [.44, 1.96] 1.62 [.70, 3.78] 
 Homemaker 1.32 [.80, 2.19] .97 [.59, 1.62] .92 [.53, 1.59] 1.13 [.64, 1.99] 
 Self-employed .77 [.54, 1.11] 1.01 [.71, 1.43] 1.01 [.68, 1.49] .79 [.53, 1.19] 
 Employed for wages         
Resident > 10 years 1.36 [.67, 2.75] .60 [.29, 1.22] 1.25 [.58, 2.69] .83 [.39, 1.78] 
 5 to < 10 years 1.56 [.75, 3.24] .85 [.40, 1.80] 1.63 [.73, 3.62] .87 [.39, 1.92] 
 2 to < 10 years 1.35 [.63, 2.91] .81 [.37, 1.77] 1.49 [.64, 3.45] .80 [.35, 1.86] 
 < 2 years         
ACLG Rural and remote  .88 [.63, 1.23] .95 [.68, 1.33] .74 [.51, 1.06] .82 [.56, 1.19] 
 Urban regional  .89 [.64, 1.25] 1.18 [.84, 1.64] .76 [.53, 1.08] .81 [.56, 1.17] 
 Urban fringe  .99 [.71, 1.37] .89 [.64, 1.24] 1.04 [.73, 1.49] 1.05 [.73, 1.51] 
 Urban dev. small .99 [.72, 1.38] .90 [.65, 1.25] .84 [.58, 1.20] .93 [.64, 1.35] 
 Urban dev. large & capitals          
















The reference category is: Worse/Much Worse; *p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01  



































































 INTERNAL USE Page 1 
Table A1:  Variables included in regression 
Variables N percent 
Male 919 45.8 
Age 1087 54.2 
 18-29 156 7.8 
 30-39 284 14.2 
 40-49 363 18.1 
 50-59 457 22.8 
 60-69 380 18.9 
 70 plus 366 18.2 
Political affiliation   
 None – change from election to election 345 18.5 
 Labor 628 33.7 
 Greens 168 9.0 
 Other (minor parties and independent) 80 4.3 
 Liberal/National Coalition 640 34.4 
Knowledge of the name of their Mayor 1042 51.9 
Speak a language other than English at home 149 7.4 
Education   
 Postgraduate 286 14.3 
 Bachelors 527 26.4 
 Certificate/Diploma 632 31.6 
 School level 550 27.6 
Employment status    
 Unemployed 83 4.1 
 Retired 596 30.0 
 Student 53 2.7 
 Homemaker 94 4.7 
 Self-employed 207 10.4 
 Employed for wages 919 46.2 
Time resident in local area   
 More than ten years 1381 3.0 
 Five to less than ten years 368 9.6 
 Two to less than five years 192 18.4 
 Less than two years 59 69.1 
Local government classification type   
 Rural and remote (rural, agricultural and remote) 385 19.2 
 Urban Regional (regional towns and cities) 409 20.4 
 Urban Fringe (90% of population urban; on margin of urban regional and 
developed) 
410 20.4 
 Urban Metropolitan Developed Small/Medium (urban centre to pop. 70,000) 393 19.6 
 Urban Metropolitan Developed Large/Very Large and Capital Cities (urban 
centre with pop. 70,000 or more and capital city councils) 
409 20.4 
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